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Abstract 
In his book, ‘Information Inequality’ (1996) Herbert Schiller argues that, by 
the mid-1990s, information had become another commodity of the newly 
global political system of market capitalism and this development was 
instrumental in widening the gap between the poorest and the best off in 
American society.  This paper reviews Schiller’s claims and examines its 
bearing on society in the decade and half since the publication of his book. 
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In Schiller’s view, information can be treated either as a social good or as a privately 
produced commodity (1996 p35).  As a social good, information is essential to the 
functioning and development of a healthy democracy.  It facilitates the meaningful 
participation of all citizens in government and it also enables decision-makers to allocate 
resources in an egalitarian and rational manner so as to maximise the wellbeing of society 
as a whole (Ibid.).   
 
However, Schiller argues that by the mid-90s, information has become primarily a market 
commodity (Ibid.).  To illustrate this development, Schiller quotes then US President Bill 
Clinton declaring information to be the king of the global economy and its possession 
the principal measure of wealth (Schiller; 1996 p103).   
 
This shift in attitude towards information was facilitated by the disappearance, with the 
fall of the Berlin Wall, of a considerable and functioning rival political system to 
capitalism.  The ‘end of history’ as Francis Fukuyama (1989) famously declared, left many 
to believe that there was no conceivable alternative to the superiority of the market 
(Schiller; 1996 pxv).  Schiller argued that the absence of such competition declaredly 
focused on maximising social well-being had removed all pressure from American leaders 
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to reduce the evident social and economic inequalities across the country, allowing the 
gap to widen instead by letting profit take priority (Ibid. pxv).  
 
The primacy of greater private returns in a corporate-led economy subjected structures, 
institutions and ideas of public interest to a cost-benefit analysis.  The inability to 
sufficiently quantify the social benefit of such structures resulted in either their 
elimination or their privatisation (Ibid).   
 
Similar to other facets of public life, access to information was also turned into a for-
profit transaction.  After market logic was imposed on such fundamental, information-
related structures of a democratic society as broadcasting, public schools, universities, 
public libraries and local governments, they were either dismantled completely or their 
functions were changed, often contrary to their original, social mission (Ibid. pp28-9).   
 
Privatisation of the information sector often took place under the guise of technological 
advances.  The development of computer technology provided the pretext, for example, 
for passing off the compilation, processing and packaging of public information 
originally handled by government and academia to private businesses who then sold such 
information for profit as a commodity (Ibid. p35).  Consequently, the collection, content, 
classification and presentation of information that was once public became governed by 
profit considerations. When unprofitable data are not collected, the result is ‘data 
deprivation’ that damages the public information supply and hinders the government’s 
performance of its social function of protection (Ibid. p51).  Schiller illustrated the 
ongoing loss of data with an American Library Association report that found a quarter of 
the US government’s publications eliminated in little over a decade (Ibid. p49). 
 
The information sector is of extraordinary importance in the United States, both as an 
employer and income generator and also as a symbolic setting for the creation of the 
nation’s ideas, values and expectations (Ibid. pxvi).  However, according to Schiller, by 
the mid-90s, this vital sector had become profit-focused and centralised under the 
management of the beneficiaries of the system (Ibid.).  Deregulation led to the creation of 
media conglomerates such as Disney, Time Warner and Microsoft, that controlled output 
across the broadcasting, entertainment, and communication sectors in order to generate 
maximum profits (Ibid. p95).  Those who could not afford quality information were 
denied access to it and were instead inundated with debased messages that contributed to 
the widening inequality within society (Ibid. pxvi). 
 
Another danger of corporate domination is information being manipulated as a tool for 
the ruling ideology.  Profit considerations led to the corporate control of the 
broadcasting industry as it became heavily reliant on advertising revenues.  With the help 
of television, the corporate voice prevailed and marginalised all opposing views that 
could have gathered countrywide support the way the trade unions and the civil rights 
movement had done decades earlier (Ibid. p117).  As an example, Schiller quoted a 1989 
Fairness and Accuracy in Reporting (FAIR) study of the television news programmes 
‘Nightline’ and ‘MacNeil/Lehrer Newshour’ (Ibid. p16).  The report found that the 
shows’ narrow ‘political scope generally exclude[d] critics in favor [sic] of voices of the 
powerful’ (Ibid. p16).   
 
In academia, the commodification of information meant that privately funded 
educational institutions primed the privileged in the prevailing ideals and methods of free 
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market capitalism (Ibid. pxvi), while scientific research was pursued with profit in mind 
(Ibid. pp46-7). 
 
The escalating commercialisation of information, Schiller believed, exacerbated the class 
inequality already inherent in the structure of American society (Ibid. p49).  It was done 
by funnelling advantages to the elites who could afford superior, often previously 
unobtainable information while holding back others, for whom the availability of 
information as well as its quality declined (Ibid.).  The Clinton administration promoted 
the Internet as the means to even out disparate access to information; however, it 
envisioned private companies taking the lead, and in Schiller’s view, that could only mean 
that the primary goal of development would be profit maximisation by catering to the 
wants of the rich (Ibid. p96). 
 
In conclusion, Schiller saw the commercialisation of the information sector as part of a 
wilful effort by corporate interests to weaken the state and its democratic and social 
functions in order to pursue their profit-maximising agenda unhindered (Ibid. p55).  He 
noted that corporations were becoming increasingly global in their operations, which 
allowed them to escape accountability in all jurisdictions (Ibid. p103).  This development, 
he believed, was weakening the government that, lacking publicly funded and freely 
available information networks, would not be able to respond to crises that corporate 
interests and market forces were unwilling or unable to solve; for example, an emergency 
posed by climate change (Ibid. p136).  Why would corporations push for people to switch 
to bicycles when they can sell cars, he asked (Ibid. p136).  In the absence of democratic 
tools, he predicted, a likely rightist regime will incite class conflict by placing the heaviest 
burdens on the weakest while claiming to pursue national goals (Ibid. p140). 
 
However, Schiller thought that this highly dysfunctional nature of American society and 
the presence of a large, though unorganised, group of dissenters, might signal a hotbed 
of change for the ‘next climactic human advance’ (Ibid. p143).  He believed that such a 
change would have to rewrite current assumptions about the structure of American 
society (Ibid. p142).  He hoped that as a result, Americans would stop equating freedom 
and liberty with the inviolability of corporate and individual property ownership and 
‘unaccountable self-indulgence’, and move human existence ‘beyond commodity 
relationships’ (Ibid. p142). 
 
Schiller’s concerns and predictions from the mid-90s inevitably bring to mind the 
subprime mortgage crisis of 2006-7 in the United States, which brought down the global 
financial system and triggered the worst recession in America and globally since the 
Great Depression of the 1930s, as well as the election of Barack Obama to the office of 
President.  These events seem to have played out Schiller’s scenario in many respects.   
 
Trends highlighted by Schiller as signalling the sustained commodification of information 
have continued in the years since his book was published.  In the 2000s, the Federal 
Communications Commission (FCC) re-regulated the information market in favour of 
big broadcasting and telecommunications industry companies and allowed the cross-
ownership of media companies (Castells; 2009 p108).  These measures resulted in more 
large-scale concentration in the information sector, benefitting entities such as Rupert 
Murdoch’s News Corporation (Ibid. p108).  The handful of owners and controllers of 
media companies continue to have the power to decide the content and format of 
information passing through their channels of communication (Ibid. p420).  For example, 
documentaries exposing the profiteering of corporate greed during the Iraq war, such as 
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Robert Greenwald’s ‘Iraq for Sale’ (Patterson; 2006), or even paid-for commercials 
seeking to put forward an opposing view to that war2 are kept from appearing on 
American TV screens by the resistance of broadcasting and cable-company executives 
(Nichols; 2003).   
 
Information sector institutions with vital social functions continue to risk the reversal of 
their missions and the privatisation of their services, which would make them harder to 
reach by the less well off.  Ostensibly in response to the recession, top-tier publicly 
funded universities such as the University of Michigan and the University of California, 
Berkeley, are implementing sharp fee rises for local students and are also recruiting more 
out-of-state students who can be charged fees well above the locals’ (Fein; 2009).  Such 
developments are widely seen as a move towards privatising these institutions, whose 
original mission was to provide an affordable avenue of upward mobility to the less well 
off by offering them education that is comparable to that available at elite, private 
universities (Ibid.).   
 
Technology is still a tool for paring down the public sphere.  The arrival of e-books has 
become yet another technological advance that is now used to justify reducing free public 
library services.  Publishers such as Macmillan and Simon & Schuster3 refuse to sell e-
book versions of their publications to public libraries for fear that their availability at no 
charge will cut into their profits (Rich; 2009).  
 
Internationally, the US Government has continued to push the corporate agenda in the 
information sector by throwing its weight behind such international agreements as 
GATS4 and TRIPS5; the first aimed at commercialising services like public libraries and 
the second at globalising US intellectual property laws, in order keep knowledge assets in 
the hands of corporations without concern for the importance of the free flow of 
information to continued global development (Rikowski; 2005).  
 
As the effects of the commodification of information on class inequality have become 
undeniable, the debate was reframed under the concept of ‘digital divide’.  Some 
commentators consider this change of terminology a political tool to deflect attention 
from the injustice of uneven distribution of resources by portraying it instead as merely a 
question of access to technology (Liangzhi; 2006 p243).  Although the existence of a 
yawning gap between two classes of people is not disputed (van Dijk et al; 2000 p16 ), 
attempts to close it by narrow, short-term, technology-based initiatives appear to have 
failed by not addressing the underlying patterns of systemic disadvantage (Kvasny et al; 
2006).  On the other hand, because such schemes promote the purchase of technological 
tools, they did benefit the corporate interests in control of the information sector. 
                                                             
2 Comcast, the nation's No. 1 owner of cable television companies, rebutted the Peace Action 
Education Fund's request to purchase airtime for ads opposing an attack on Iraq while CNN, 
Fox and NBC refused to sell airtime for an ad from the Win Without War coalition (Nichols; 
2003). 
 
3 Simon & Schuster publishes books by such popular authors as Stephen King and Bob 
Woodward (Rich; 2009). 
 
4 General Agreement on Trade and Services 1994. 
 
5 Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 1995. 
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Accelerating globalisation continues to weaken the nation state, including America, in 
line with Schiller’s observations.  Governments have indeed been unable to act in the 
crises that affect all but are not prone to business solutions.  They are yet to implement 
measures sufficient to tackle the devastation of climate change as evidenced by their lack 
of success at the 2009 Copenhagen Climate Conference.  
 
In spite of the unprecedented concentration of corporate power in the information 
sector, Schiller appears to have been justified in hanging on to a glimmer of hope.  The 
FCC decisions paving a way for the extraordinary media concentration also triggered an 
outbreak of protests from activists.  These protests have snowballed into the social 
movement of a broad-based coalition of civil organisations6 that fought the FCC for 
citizen control in the communication sector (Castells; 2009 p108).  Ordinary Americans 
had realised that arrangements within the communication system were not 
predetermined and decided to fight for their say in shaping them.  Their biggest fight to 
date came in the national debate over ‘net neutrality’7 that pits internet users, content 
providers and innovative high-tech businesses against network operators for free and 
open access to the Internet and against its private control (Castells; 2009 pp106-8).  In 
October 2009, the persistence of this social movement aided by the Obama 
administration won out and prompted the FCC to propose for consultation formal rules 
to guarantee net neutrality (Albanesius; 2009).  This is certainly a victory, although some 
doubt whether these rules will be adopted in an undiluted form (Downes; 2010).  
 
Service providers’ attempts to fence off the ‘commons’ of free communication and 
charge fees for access in return for invading users’ privacy and targeting them with 
advertising has been characterised as the ‘commodification of freedom’ (Castells; 2009 
p421).  Still, while corporations rush to invest in rapidly developing technology and try to 
squeeze out as much profit as possible, once on the Internet, users can self-publish their 
thoughts, find the ideas of others and build networks of allies (Ibid. p421).  By doing this, 
they paradoxically empower themselves to challenge the values and interests of the very 
corporations that provide the enabling technology (Ibid. p421). 
 
Thus the large number of dissidents envisioned by Schiller did organise since the 
publication of his book.  Their dissent was largely aimed at the rightist administration of 
George W. Bush, who many believed had placed the heaviest burdens on the weakest in 
society.  Their evidence included his government’s handling of the aftermath of 
Hurricane Katarina, and the fact that ordinary citizens were left encumbered with the 
fallout from banks’ failed gambles in the wake of the subprime loan crisis.  However, the 
dissidents found a way to organise using the tools provided to them by the very 
corporate interests Schiller had expected to be their target.  
 
Barack Obama, seen as a political outsider, tapped into this grass-roots, and in large part 
on-line, network of dissenters with unprecedented success (Castells; 2009 p393).  This 
enabled him to finance his presidential campaign to a large extent with money raised 
from the powerless instead of funds from corporate donations (Ibid. p413).  He 
                                                             
6 E.g.: Free Press, Center for Digital Democracy, Media Alliance, etc. (Castells; 2009 p108). 
 
7 The concept of ‘net neutrality’ considers the carrier network as common use infrastructure, 
access to which must be non-discriminatory and unconditional to every user (Castells; 2009 
p106). 
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consequently gained some degree of freedom from such interests and, at the same time, 
restored an element of democracy to the electoral process (Ibid. p413).  
 
The power of grass-roots organising over the Internet did not diminish after the 2008 
elections.  In the autumn of 2009, the grass-roots political group MoveOn, raised over 
$3.5 million from its members over the Internet and successfully pressured errant 
Democrat lawmakers into supporting President Obama’s health care reforms in the US 
House of Representatives (York; 2009).   
 
Thus, although Schiller’s concerns regarding the commodification of information and 
class inequality are very much relevant today, his vision for the future so far has played 
out with a twist.  Dissenting citizens embraced the tools sold by corporations to create 
and find information outside corporate control and to effect change.  It is not clear yet, 
but unlikely, that this change is the ‘next climactic human advance’ as Schiller had hoped.  
Though the subprime loan crisis and the recession that followed it made many question 
whether liberty indeed equals ‘unaccountable self-indulgence’, these voices are 
surprisingly muffled and are not likely to move American society ‘beyond commodity 
relationships’ in the near future.  One reason may be that the dissenters who have been 
able to organize over the Internet do not come from the most disadvantaged layers of 
society, as evidenced by the digital divide debate.  Nevertheless, the freedom of the 
Internet is the great frontier in the information age and the opportunities it provides for 
empowerment should be made accessible to all. 
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